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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the national characteristics of culture, religion and political factionalization are associated with the strength of accounting enforcement. The study uses data on percentages of religious adherents
in a sample nation, the Hofstede cultural dimensions and political factionalization. National legal code (e.g., Common Law
or Civic Code) and market liquidity are controlled for. Factor analysis is used to generate factor scores from the data. The
dependent variable, accounting enforcement, is drawn from Brown et al. (J Bus Finance Account 41(1/2):1–52, 2014).
The findings demonstrate that this set of national characteristics is strongly associated with national accounting regulatory
enforcement. The implications of this research are that national characteristics should be taken into account in considering
the impact of accounting standards on accounting comparability across nations. The limitation of this study is that, like much
international research, the sample size is limited, here to 42 nations. The authors collectively have many years of research
examining/studying domestic and international regulation, its determinants and consequences. This study importantly extends
previous research on the determinants and consequences of regulation in the auditing and accounting arenas. This study
provides an important contribution to the literature by helping establish that national characteristics do affect accounting
enforcement efforts cross-nationally. This helps researchers and regulators better understand whether international standards
can provide the link in comparability across nations that proponents are seeking. It does so by focusing on the variation in
enforcement across nations rather than on the standards themselves.
Keywords Accounting enforcement · Accounting quality · Culture · Religion · Political factionalization · IFRS · Regulation

Introduction
One of the central goals of having a global set of financial
reporting standards is to create a more cohesive and comparable international financial reporting environment.1 In
fact, the call for global reporting standards has been ongoing
since the mid-twentieth century, with the SEC reiterating its
commitment to a global set of accounting standards in 2010
and beyond.2 However, it remains unclear whether global
standards themselves are an achievable goal, and further,
whether these standards would provide the cohesive and
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comparable financial reporting desired (Leuz 2010). Recent
events also point to a trend of pushback against globalization. These events include the “Brexit” vote in the United
Kingdom, France’s “Frexit” movement’s growth, the rise
of the Alternatives for Germany Party (AfD), and rising
nationalistic, populist movements in the United States and
elsewhere. This trend has caught the attention of financial
and political elites cross-nationally, fueling arguments that
more attention should be paid to national characteristics and
national welfare as opposed to an elite preference toward
globalization (e.g., Summers 2016; King 2016).
Although there has been a push for globalization of
accounting standards, Gillis et al. (2014) note that little
research has been done on the transnational regulation of
accounting, and they argue that it is important to understand the drivers of such regulation. Brown et al. (2014)
and Preiato et al. (2015) address transnational regulation of
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accounting by studying the enforcement of accounting standards, noting that enforcement of regulation varies between
nations and has significant impacts on uncertainty in the
financial markets. Brown et al. (2014) and Preiato et al.
(2015) demonstrate that the accounting enforcement index
that they developed impacts accounting quality of nations in
their sample, as measured in their studies. However, no studies have looked at the potential drivers of accounting standards enforcement in a multinational setting. This paper fills
this gap in the literature. By doing so, this study adds important findings to the discussion of whether it is reasonable to
expect similar enforcement of accounting standards across
nations, and provides researchers with an important control
for studies exploring international accounting standards.
Studying accounting standards enforcement is particularly important with the widespread adoption of IFRS and
other local accounting standards. Although there have been
many studies evaluating IFRS adoption, they do not take
into consideration, to any great extent, the operating environment of the countries adopting these standards and how
this affects enforcement, and ultimately the quality and comparability of financial statements across nations. Without
comparable enforcement, the same type of standards “on
paper” can easily lead to differing financial reporting results.
Consider IFRS 13, which permits reporting of certain assets
at fair value. It uses a variety of hierarchical measurement
techniques. In a country with weak enforcement, corporations may have much latitude to report assets at the value
most advantageous to them, whereas in a country with
strong enforcement, corporations may not have such latitude.
It would seem as if the same standards should result in the
same accounting, but, given different levels of enforcement,
it may not. Thus, when utilizing judgment required by many
IFRS standards, strong enforcement would appear necessary
to ensure maximum comparability.
This paper sheds light on the relationship between
national characteristics and the level of regulatory enforcement. This paper specifically identifies legal origin, culture,
religion, and market development following Leuz (2010). It
also includes a political factor, political factionalization of
the elite. This has been missing from prior literature. While
Leuz (2010) incorporates several important characteristics
that encompass a nation, he does not account for political
factions, which is likely to influence regulation. Additionally, Leuz (2010) looks at culture as a package of attributes
making it difficult to draw conclusions. This paper breaks
down cultural attributes to enable a specific understanding of
which are associated with accounting regulation. It focuses
specifically on religion and other cultural variables found to
be associated with societal behaviors and with regulation
(e.g., Duong et al. 2016; Cowperthwaite 2010). Religion and
culture are very powerful forces affecting human behavior
(Kleinman et al. 2014). In doing this analysis, this study
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provides a more focused lens into factors associated with
accounting regulation.
Global reporting standards are intended to create financial
reporting that is consistent across nations. However, from
a functionalist perspective, which views aspects of a society as connected so that they mutually influence each other,
national characteristics are likely to influence how accounting standards are implemented and further how they are
enforced. In fact, the practice of law, medicine and accounting have all been found to differ between nations (see, for
example, La Porta et al. 1998; McPherson 1989; Evans et al.
2015; Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai 2007).
This study focuses on the influences of national characteristics on enforcement3 of accounting standards for 42
nations. The results of this study show that a country’s religious environment, national culture, political environment,
legal origin, and financial market liquidity are all associated with the level of accounting enforcement in the sample
nations. This is an important contribution to the literature
on the relationship between culture and regulation because it
will help regulators understand whether adjustments to local
regulation will have the desired effect of making accounting
standards more uniform. Further it will help regulators create enforcement legislation that may be more useful when
considering specific cultural nuances. This contribution is
particularly important given the current political climate in
which Western alliances have been facing increasing stress,
where it is likely that national characteristics will become
even more pronounced and important in regulation and
enforcement.
These results should also be of interest to standard-setters, who are concerned with factors that influence financial
statement quality and comparability, and to researchers who
want to understand the nexus between accounting standards,
accounting standards enforcement, and the financial statements themselves. They should also provide an understanding of how national characteristics may influence other
globalization efforts. “Literature review and hypothesis
development” section provides an extensive literature review
and hypothesis development, “Sample and methodology”
section discusses the sample and methodology, “Discussion
of results” section presents a discussion of results, and “Conclusions” section provides concluding remarks.

3

Enforcement represents enforcement infrastructures (also called
regimes here) recommended by the European Commission (2000) for
the enforcement of accounting standards, captured in an index created
by Brown et al. (2014).
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Literature review and hypothesis
development
This study looks at the potential drivers of accounting
enforcement. This section reviews both empirical and theoretical literature that guides the choice of factors used in the
current study. Then hypotheses based on this prior literature
are developed.
A recent theoretical study by Kleinman et al. (2014) postulates auditing enforcement regimes are a function of many
national cultural characteristics (e.g., Hofstede 2001), as
well as of religion, source of auditing and accounting standards, and legal code origin. They posit that there may be systematic differences in the implementation of common regulations based on variation in national regulatory regimes,
a point noted by Leuz (2010) as well. Kleinman and Lin
(2017) provided empirical evidence supporting this theory.
However, their study focuses on the influence of national
characteristics on auditing regulatory enforcement and not
accounting regulatory enforcement. It is important to study
the relationship of national characteristics to accounting
standards enforcement because accounting standards provide
guidelines for corporate reporting and therefore the enforcement of these standards provide a window into the rigor with
which corporate financial statements are prepared within a
nation. Auditing standards, on the other hand, provide oversight to the audit professionals, with the auditors acting as
an independent check on corporate financial reporting. The
enforcement of auditing standards provides a window into
the environment within which the audit firms exist.
Leuz (2010) studies the relationship between national
characteristics and financial market regulation by clustering nations into groups by characteristics that he deemed
to represent their culture. Characteristics including legal
origin, cultural region, market development and country
wealth are used as a basis for determining cluster membership when associating these characteristics with financial
market regulation, including securities offering disclosure
requirements, liability standards of directors, distributors
and accountants, public enforcement of securities regulation and shareholder rights. His findings indicate several
distinct clusters, and based on these findings, he argued that
effective international regulation and enforced comparability
of financial statements is unlikely without special arrangements. Although this study addresses the issue of national
characteristics and their effect on financial market regulation, it is not clear from his study which specific cultural
characteristics influence the regulation decision because he
uses very broad indices and cluster analysis. Leuz (2010)
also reports wide variation within his clusters but does not
identify the source of this variation. In comparison, this
study seeks to understand which specific cultural, religious,
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and political variables are related to regulation. In addition,
this study looks at regulation differently, using an accounting enforcement index developed by Brown et al. (2014).
It calculates an accounting enforcement activity score for
52 nations from 2002 to 2008. Brown et al. (2014, p. 1)
note that their auditing and accounting enforcement indices
“have additional explanatory power (over more general legal
proxies) for country-level measures of economic and market
activity, financial transparency and earnings management.”
This index is more relevant to an accounting study than the
measures used by Leuz, which focus broadly on financial
markets. This study uses a combination of regression and
factor analysis to look directly at the relationship between
each country’s enforcement efforts, and its religious, cultural
and political environment, in contrast to Leuz’ approach.
Other literature has also shown strong support for the
notion that institutional differences in infrastructure, culture,
legal requirements, as well as socio-economic and political
systems, may lead to non-comparable accounting figures
despite similar accounting standards (Cascino and Gassen
2015; Gordon et al. 2013; Leuz 2010; Ball et al. 2003; Cuijpers and Buijink 2005; Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai 2007).4
Gordon et al. (2013) note, for example, that the development
of accounting standards and their enforcement is likely influenced by a complex set of variables.
Many other studies have found a relationship between
national characteristics and how they influence financial
reporting quality (e.g., Armstrong et al. 2010, a result supported analytically by Ball 2001; Ball et al. 2003)., However,
these research studies have focused most frequently on legal
and political systems. Results show that markets in countries operating under code law systems had less of a reaction
to IFRS adoption than those operating under common law
systems, indicating that participants in code law systems
expected lower financial reporting value from IFRS adoption
than participants in common law systems (e.g., Ball et al.
2003). Soderstrom and Sun (2007) conducted an extensive
literature review and note that legal (e.g., code law versus
common law) and political factors such as government
corruption and the threat of expropriation may also affect
accounting quality.
Although prior literature has addressed the relationship
between national characteristics and regulation broadly,
no studies have looked at the relationship between a comprehensive model of specific national characteristics and
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Such arguments are in line with the economic sociology approach
of Granovetter (2017). Granovetter argues that human behavior and
their institutions are the outcome of the interactions between individuals, institutions, and the social, economic, political, religious and
cultural environments within which they are embedded. Fligstein and
McAdam (2012) present a theory of fields, providing a mechanism by
which institutional and other development may occur.
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accounting standards enforcement. It is important to look
at this relationship because other literature finds that social
order is a partial function of such characteristics (Friedland
and Alford 1991; Hallett and Ventresca 2006; Friedland
2009; Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai 2007). Additionally, while
Leuz (2010) finds that characteristics of countries cluster
into meaningful segments, and that segment membership
did have an impact on enforcement, his approach does not
allow a breakdown of particular variable influences upon the
regulatory enforcement choice, a choice that, he notes, varies a great deal between nations in the same segment in his
own sample. Even in very embedded stews, it is important
to know which ingredients best affect the flavor.
Next, relevant literature in regard to culture, religion and
political factionalization is reviewed.

Culture
Literature looking at the influence of culture on various
matters of interest frequently utilizes cultural dimensions
identified and defined by Hofstede (1980, 1983, 1984, pp.
83–84) and his subsequent works. This literature often connects culture with other influences. According to Richardson
(2007), Hofstede (1980) argues that his cultural framework
is impacted by external influences (e.g., natural events,
investment, and conquest). Such influences affect ecological factors including history, economics and demographics,
which in turn affect Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. These
cultural dimensions potentially impact such institutions as
religion, political, legal and education systems. The institutions, of course, further affect the cultural dimensions and
the aforesaid ecological factors.
This characterization is consistent with Granovetter
(2017) and Fligstein and McAdam (2012). Karaibrahimoglu
and Cangarli (2016), find a moderating effect of culture on
the relationship between the strength of auditing standards
and firms’ ethical behaviors. Karaibrahimoglu and Cangarli
(2016) agree with Granovetter on the important impact of
culture and other institutional factors. Accordingly, ethics
and regulation may be seen as alternatives to each other but
not as mutually exclusive means of controlling the financial
reporting behavior of corporations. Ethics and what are considered ethical violations are influenced by culture, as are
the consequences of such behavior. Since the impact of conscience on behavior is uncertain, in that conscience speaks
to different people in different ways, understanding culture’s
relationship to regulation and behavior is important.
Minnis and Shroff (2017, p. 5) explore determinants of
financial regulation (specifically on financial disclosure and
auditing reports, not standard setting), finding that there is
a “…rich heterogeneity across countries in terms of both
reporting differences and institutional differences.” Minnis
and Shroff (2017, p. 3) note that “the extent to which each
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of the benefits and costs weighs into a country’s culture and
institutional framework is likely to shape the country’s level
of regulation (Leuz 2010).” Because of the strong connection between culture and its influence on consequences, it is
important to include cultural variables here.
Hofstede identifies and defines significant societal values
to include Individualism (versus Collectivism), Power Distance (Large versus Small), Uncertainty Avoidance (Strong
versus Weak), Masculinity (versus Femininity), Long-term
Orientation (versus Short-term Normative Orientation), and
Indulgence (versus Restraint). Richardson (2007) uses these
cultural dimensions and finds that individualism, power distance, and uncertainty avoidance were related to “tax values”
in a sample of 43 nations, but does not find significance for
masculinity. Studies by Cowperthwaite (2010) and Kanagaretnam et al. (2014) find similar results. Nabar and BoonlertU-Thai (2007) also find that a nation’s uncertainty avoidance
influences earnings management. Other studies have demonstrated the relevance of Hofstede’s culture concepts to the
accounting profession (e.g., Gray 1988; Doupnik and Tsakumis 2004). Further, Hofstede’s (2001) measures of culture
are used here because the vast majority of culture research
in management and international business is built on these
scores (e.g., Tosi and Greckhamer 2004; Han et al. 2010),
as well as culture research in finance according to Reuter
(2011). Readings in the accounting literature itself support
the notion that Hofstede’s measure is the most widely such
used measure in accounting research. Further, Voss (2012)
does a head-to-head comparison of Hofstede’s constructs to
the House et al. (2004) GLOBE culture measure, thought by
some to be a more current measure, and finds that Hofstede’s
formulations are superior.
Cowperthwaite (2010) notes that there is increasing evidence that national cultural traits influence all aspects of its
citizens’ lives, including social interactions, dealing with
power inequality, and response to uncertainty. He finds from
his professional experience that auditing is no exception. Fisman and Miguel (2007) provide additional direct evidence
on the influence that cultural norms and legal enforcement
play with regard to corruption patterns. Orij (2010), using
a sample of 600 firms drawn from 22 nations, found that
national culture influenced corporate social responsibility
reporting levels.
Leung et al. (2005, p. 362; see also Granovetter 2017)
note that “culture is often viewed as a multi-level construct
that consists of various levels nested within each other from
the most macro-level of a global culture, through national
cultures, organizational cultures, group cultures, and cultural values that are represented in the self at the individual
level.” This nesting effect argues against Leuz’s (2010)
division of the world into seven geographic sectors, sectors
which conflate culture, legal code, and other characteristics. Leung et al.’s statements about culture as a multi-level
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construct intimates that much understanding may be lost
with higher and higher levels of aggregation. Thus, use of
national data will provide more important insight into the
operation of culture on accounting regulatory enforcement
choices, choices that are made at the national level, than
will Leuz’s (2010) aggregation of nations into geographic
sectors. While Oh et al. (2010) note that cultural variations
exist within nations (see also Granovetter 2017; Fligstein
and McAdam 2012), this does not disturb this effort since
national regulatory efforts are the most disaggregated level
of measurement possible.
Culture is important because, as Williamson (2000: cited
by Lievenbrück and Schmid 2014) notes, it impacts decision
making. Further, since culture is embedded in the national
context, it changes very slowly (e.g., Lievenbrück and
Schmid 2014; Davis and Williamson 2016). According to
Lievenbrück and Schmid (2014, p. 94), Williamson’s schema
for the impact of culture on decision making argues that
“culture influences decision making in two ways. First, culture shapes the formal institutional environment in a country…. [The] second, direct way in which culture influences
decision making: via informal rules and standards.” North
(1991; cited in Lievenbrück and Schmid 2014) notes that
formal constraints (e.g., laws) on behavior are inadequate
in themselves, but require culture-based constraints as an
assist to such formal structures as the law. Indeed, the author
notes, culture may shape the formal constraints themselves.
It is important, then, to understand the relationship of culture to formal constraints, here expressed as regulations over
accounting practice. Given the extant literature indicating
the importance of culture with respect to behavior, and following prior research that particularly focuses on certain of
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, the following variables have
been selected for study here: Individualism, Power Distance,
and Uncertainty Avoidance.
Hofstede’s first societal value, Individualism, refers to the
limited interdependence of a society within which individuals tend to take care of only themselves and their immediate
families (Hofstede 1984, 2001). This is in direct contrast
to Collectivism, which represents a tightly knit community
where relatives and clan members are expected to take care
of each other in exchange for complete loyalty (see also
Franke et al. 1991). Individualism may lead to stronger
accounting enforcement because individuals are all independently looking out for their own best interests and therefore
there is a need for monitoring (e.g., Hofstede et al. 2010).
In contrast, Davis and Williamson (2016) found that highly
individualistic countries tended to have lighter regulation of
business entry than did less individualistic countries. This
effect was stronger in nations with a greater democratic tradition and those having a common law tradition.
Alternatively, a collectivist culture is one in which citizens work together as a group, and this may create a strong
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alliance toward or against regulations and the enforcement
of said regulations. Collectivist culture may serve to mitigate
the need for regulation because internal pressures within
society may lead to the desired behavior without regulation. On the other hand, it may push groups against adopting
norms for compliance with rules and therefore regulation
may be needed to constrict group behavior so as to force
compliance with the ends that the regulation seeks to bring
about. Thus, independence may pull regulation in one direction and collectivism may pull it in another. The literature
supports the impact of culture, including independence/collectivism on behavior. Accordingly, the following hypothesis
is offered.
H1 A country’s degree of Individualism will be associated
with accounting regulatory enforcement.
The second societal value, Power Distance, refers to the
way a society manages inequalities among members of the
society when such inequalities occur (Hofstede 1984). People in societies with large Power Distance are more accepting of hierarchical order and their place in the hierarchy and
are unlikely to question this. People in societies with small
Power Distance are interested in equal power and would
question and demand justification for inequalities in power.
Therefore, where small Power Distance is a dominant culture, stronger enforcement of regulations is more likely to
ensure that members of the societies are equally protected.
Individuals in greater power distance societies may be more
accepting of a lack of effective regulation, resulting in less
pressure for regulation.
On the other hand, in greater power distance societies,
regulation might be seen as a necessary concomitant of
social justice, in which the elite themselves impose regulation to at least protect themselves from informational
predation by other members of the elite when transacting
commercial transactions, including acquisition of other companies’ equity. That is, different members of the elite may
also suffer from informational insufficiency about proposed
transactions. While these powerful elites may possess the
resources to gather information on proposed acquisition targets, etc., doing so on any wide scale may prove enormously
expensive. Enlisting the power of the state, through regulation, may ease transactional costs that occur in transactions
among the elites. The following hypothesis is offered.
H2 The degree of Power Distance will be associated with
accounting regulatory enforcement.
The third societal value, Uncertainty Avoidance, refers
to the way the society reacts to uncertainty, and the degree
to which they feel uncomfortable with ambiguity (Hofstede
1984). A society with strong Uncertainty Avoidance would
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have a strict code of behavior and be intolerant of those
defying that code of behavior because such defiance raises
questions about the environment within which people live,
whether financial or otherwise. Thus, environments that are
more ambiguous raise the anxieties of those within that environment. Presumably those who are more uncertainty avoidant will experience more distress from such rule-breaking or
disparate behaviors. A society with weak Uncertainty Avoidance on the other hand would be more relaxed and tolerant
of those with ideas in defiance of the societal principles or
norms of behavior, including behavior within the financial
and accounting fields.
A country with a strong inclination to avoid uncertainty
could, on the one hand, be more likely to strongly enforce
accounting regulation because not doing so could lead to
more uncertainty with accounting results and the interpretation of information. However, it could on the other hand
lead to inappropriate enforcement, whereby whatever is initially enforced becomes the overriding focus of enforcement
efforts, even if it is an inappropriate or inefficient regulatory measure. As has been said, original source unknown,
the government that can give you everything you want can
take away everything you have. Moreover, since people in
low Uncertainty Avoidance societies have greater tolerance
of uncertainty, they are more open to reforms and changes
when such need arises. Therefore, the following hypothesis
is offered:
H3 The degree of Uncertainty Avoidance will be associated
with accounting regulatory enforcement.

Factionalized elites
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions capture important aspect of
national environments. The political environment is also
likely to be related to behavior at the national level. Hillman and Keim (1995) propose a theoretical framework for
understanding the way that governments and businesses
operate and intersect, acknowledging that in addition to formal roles and legal constraints within a country, there are
also informal rules and constraints set by societal norms and
organizational culture. All of these intersect to create within
each country a unique political environment that affects the
efficiency and functioning of the societal activities. In other
words, in addition to Power Distance and hierarchical order,
there are also factions that may emerge within a society,
based on such roles. These dueling political groups within
a society are known as factionalized elites. Although they
do not necessarily represent a hierarchical division, they do
nonetheless represent a political division in society that may
war to push/pull the society in different directions on matters
of interest.
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It is unclear whether such divisions foster a stronger
accounting regulatory enforcement environment or not.
On the one hand, a hierarchical society could provide a
circumstance where the higher status members are able to
manipulate the regulatory environment, resulting in a weaker
enforcement effort (Fukuyama 2014a, b). On the other hand,
it could allow those higher status members to suggest a
more efficient enforcement environment wherein the most
members are provided with the most effective regulation
and enforcement. Adding to this, factionalized elites could
provide more accountability in a society due to the dissonance within, or it could provide for a smaller enforcement
effort due to instability within the government as a result of
such groups.
The presence of factionalized elites may make it cost
effective for the elites to rely on government or enforcement
regimes external to themselves to take on the task of regulation in that such a socialized system of providing accounting
enforcement takes the burden of private enforcement off the
elites. With such a system, the different factions within the
elite could rely on effective government (or other) enforcement efforts to help ensure the quality of accounting in firms
that one faction of the elite wishes to buy from another.
This stands in contrast to having the purchasing faction
engage in its own investigative activity with respect to the
quality of the acquisition target’s accounting. A unified, or
otherwise monolithic elite, in contrast, may see little use in
accounting enforcement in that the unified elite may share
accurate financial information among themselves, and may
not want enforcement of high-quality financial accounting
information to be made available to non-elite actors who
may be interested in investing, wealth redistribution or tax
law enforcement.5
In a related vein, Ali and Hwang (2000) find that countries with heavy reliance on government standard-setters
rather than private sector standard-setters place less reliance
on published financial reports, likely due to the focus on
regulatory standards at the expense of standards demanded
by investors. Government standard-setters can bring to bear
the full power of the government on those not compliant
with government standards without invoking an intermediate mechanism (e.g., court-based activity) that may be both
more costly, less efficient and less timely than a socialized
system, under the aegis of the government.
Given the values stated above and the uncertainty about
how it might impact the enforcement of accounting regulation, the following hypothesis is offered:
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H4 The presence of Factionalized Elites will be associated
with accounting regulatory enforcement.

Religion and religiosity
Although culture and political environment may be powerful
national forces related to national regulation, religion has
also long been argued to be a very powerful force affecting
human behavior (e.g., Kleinman et al. 2014; Kleinman and
Lin 2017). Durkheim (1995; cited in Fligstein and McAdam
2012) argues that religion is important in that through it people have a better understanding of their place and a feeling of
being situated in the world that reduces the anxieties of existence. As such, Fligstein and McAdam (2012, p. 56) state,
“religion provide(s) a sanctified affirmation and expression
of the collective.” Further, Fligstein and McAdam (2012,
p. 58) note, religion embeds “the individual in a system of
socially constructed meanings that substitutes the ‘inner
view’ for the alienating aspects of the ‘outer’ perspective.”
In doing these things, religion allows individuals to feel as
if they were part of a greater whole.
Saroglu and Cohen (2011, p. 1311) argue that “religion
refers to all kinds of behaviors humans do in reference to
what they think is a transcendent reality; culture refers to all
psychological characteristics that distinguish natural (nonexperimental) groups.” Violating perceived religious injunctions, therefore, should be anxiety-arousing among the faithful. Religion and its diktat provide guidance on behavior,
whether narrowly defined, as in cleanliness rites, or very
broadly defined, as in the Ten Commandments in the JudeoChristian tradition.6 Maimonides (1956: 314–315) expressed
the social function of religion well when he wrote that,
“Scripture … demands belief in certain truths, the
belief in which is indispensable in regulating our
social relations; such is the belief that God is angry
with those who disobey him…In some cases the law
contains a truth which is itself the only object of that
law…In other cases, that truth is only the means of
securing the removal of injustice, or the acquisition of
good morals; such is the belief that God is angry with
those who oppress their fellowmen…or the belief that
God hears the crying of the oppressed…”
Religion acts beyond the individual, to the group in which
he/she is embedded. The power of religion is evident in its
ability to foster hostility between groups, often leading to
war (e.g., Kissinger 1994; Durant and Durant 1968). If people are willing to arm themselves and March off to slaughter
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in the name of their God, they may be willing to undertake other behaviors as well, including engaging in honest
dealing.
Durkheim and others lay out strong reasons why religion has often been such a strong motivator of behavior:
religion serves as an important tool for reducing the anxieties of existence that humankind faces, doing so by placing
individuals in a broader context—as noted above. There is a
tension, though, between the individual qua individual and
the individual as one among the collective. Since individuals
can engage in individual action to achieve individual ends,
then regulation may be unnecessary if that avenue is fruitful. Doing so, however, leaves the doer bearing the burden
of the chase, a burden that may be beyond his/her capacity
or undesirable for other reasons—for example, why bear the
burdens for freeloaders who share in the benefits of one’s
activity without paying the pain? While different degrees of
what is at stake may result in different outcomes, collective
action spreads the burden among the entire interested class.
While one may believe one’s own fealty to the faith is sufficient to forfend bad behavior on one’s own part, perhaps
it is not enough on the part of others. Regulation, therefore,
serves to enforce right behavior on others.
Another reason why religion is important in this study
is the purported association between religion and morality.
Specifically, must people believe in a deity in order to behave
morally, or are religion and morality distinct and separate
things (e.g., Maimonides 1956; Hecht 2003)? As McKay
and Whitehouse (2015) note, this question is of ancient vintage, going back at least to the Platonic dialogue Euthyphro
(Cooper 1997). If religion is important to be engaged morally, then, in nations with a population that identifies with
religion perhaps regulation would be unimportant. Mathras
et al. (2017) point out, religions differ among themselves on
various dimensions. Klaubert (2010, p. 2) cites Guiso et al.
(2003) as finding that “religious people, among others, are
less willing to break the law, believe more in the fairness of
the market and have less progressive attitudes toward working women.” But then, also as Klaubert (2010, p. 2) notes,
“large deviations often exist during the translation of values and beliefs into concrete actions and behavior.” Beliefs
indeed need not call forth specific behaviors.7 To the extent
that this is understood popularly, an argument exists why
even strongly religious communities may favor behavioral
regulation.
A variety of studies have found that religion shapes
institutional behavior, popular perceptions, and accounting

7
6

Hecht (2003) provides an extensive, historical review of the role
that religion plays as a reinforcer of desirable social behavior across
centuries, cultures and continents.

In addition, there is the argument in Christianity between those
who argue that faith alone will save (e.g., Rom 3:20–22; Gal 2:16)
and the importance of good works, whether to be saved or at least
perhaps as an indication that one is predestined to be saved.
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practices.8 Mensah (2014), for example, while controlling
for various economic and political variables in his sample
of nations, found that religion plays a role in perceptions
of corruption. Specifically, he finds that the percentage of
national populations adhering to the Protestant, Buddhist
and Hindu religions was negatively associated with the perception of corruption. In contrast, the percentages of the
population adhering to other Christian religions, Islam and
other religions or not adhering to a religion was associated with greater perceptions of corruption. Einolf (2011)
also argues that religion plays an important role in shaping
behavior. One can argue that the presence of corruption is
an important factor in evaluating enforcement regulation.
La Porta et al. (1999) presents evidence that countries having higher population percentages of Catholics or Muslims
suffered from poorer government performance. In a different
but related vein, Stulz and Williamson (2003) compared the
impact of religion on creditor rights and accounting standards enforcement with that of other predictors, including the
country’s openness to international trade, its language, per
capita income or its legal system. They reported that religion
was a better predictor than openness to international trade.
Religion, therefore, influenced both policy making and the
establishment of laws. Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai (2007)
also argue that religion plays a role in behavior, specifically
that of earnings management. They find that Catholicism,
Buddhism, Protestantism and Islam were not related to earnings management. This gives rise to this hypothesis.
H5 Religious affiliation will be associated with accounting
regulatory enforcement.
Although religious affiliation captures a nation’s religious
composition, it does not take into account the importance
of such religions to its inhabitants. Religious proscriptions
against certain behaviors could influence individuals who
adhere to that religion to forebear engaging in those behaviors (e.g., Maimonides 1956). That said, though, individuals
might have beliefs without behavioral consequences. That is,
they might steal even if a fundamental tenet of the religion
to which they adhere proscribes theft. Some nations might
work hard at building institutions to enforce religious proscriptions, while others might not, with the latter perhaps
relying on individual internalization of the religious value
against, say, theft. Commonplace observations reveal that
some people express adherence to religious precepts more
strongly than others. Religious observance differs as does
the willingness to expose oneself to additional information
about what is religiously required and to act on the perceived
religious requirements (e.g., Klaubert 2010).
8
Whether religion affects individual ethical behavior, however, is a
different concern (Shariff 2015).
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Observance, though, may reflect only a superficial
attempt to conform to community norms. That is, there may
be no underlying fealty to the moral norms of the faith. Or,
observance may for others be a true reflection of underlying
beliefs and fealty. To some people then, religion is more
important than it is to others, and that felt importance is
likely to affect each individual’s behaviors (see, for example,
Hess 2012; Hilary and Hui 2009; Durant and Durant 1968;
Mathras et al. 2017).
Mathras et al. (2017) note that religious values may
increase individuals’ self-control, willingness to check selfish impulses, and willingness to work for long-term goals.
Hess (2012) reported that individuals living in locales with
stronger religious norms had stronger credit quality than
individuals in locales with weaker religious norms. Mathras et al. (2017) report that religious affiliation gives rise to
feelings of belonging to a community. As such, the norms
of the community grow stronger as the felt claims of the
community on the individual within it grow greater. Thus,
the power of norms would be greater as well.
McGuire et al. (2012) studied the association of religion
and financial reporting behavior in the USA. They find that
firms headquartered in areas with strong religious social
norms generally have fewer cases of financial reporting
irregularities and are associated with lower accounting risk.
Religious influence, therefore, seems to work against enactment of unethical behaviors (see also Maimonides 1956).
Mathras et al. (2017) note that different religions place different emphases on who may forgive offenses and which
infractions can be forgiven. Further, Mathras et al. (2017,
p. 305) note, “the stronger good-evil divisions in Western
religions (but less so in Eastern religions) leads to a heavier
insistence on personally avoiding evil and punishing evildoers.” Different religions may rely more on conscience as
a constraint, versus external sanction as a constraint. The
distinction is important since regulation, by definition, is an
external constraint.
Accordingly, the relationship of felt importance of religion to accounting regulatory enforcement is tested. It is
possible that greater felt importance of religion is more
likely to result in a feeling that greater regulatory enforcement is necessary to ensure that others behave in accordance
with religious, ethical and moral precepts, as reflected in the
honesty of the financial statements. Conversely, it is possible that societies in which religion is felt to be of greater
importance may feel that greater accounting regulatory
enforcement effort is not needed because other individuals will almost automatically follow religious precepts of
ethical and moral behavior. Accordingly, this study tests the
association of the importance ascribed to religion by individuals and levels of regulatory enforcement. The following
hypothesis is offered:
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H6 Religious importance will be associated with accounting
regulatory enforcement.

Sample and methodology
To test the hypotheses, this study uses the accounting
enforcement index created by Brown et al. (2014). This
index measures accounting enforcement efforts using an
international sample. Brown et al. (2014) argue that using
previous “rule of law” proxies (e.g., Leuz 2010; La Porta
et al. 1998) to measure regulatory effects on accounting
enforcements was not enough. Previous regulation and
enforcement proxies were not able to capture the specific
accounting enforcement activities that took place in the postSarbanes–Oxley period. Brown et al. (2014, p. 3) defines
enforcement as the “the activities undertaken by independent
bodies (monitoring, reviewing, educating and sanctioning)
to promote firms’ compliance with accounting standards
in their statutory financial statements.” They found their
accounting enforcement index had significant incremental
explanatory power in predicting analyst forecast errors and
dispersion when more general enforcement proxies were also
included in the model. However, their studies did not explore
the association between country characteristics and variation in accounting enforcement efforts across countries. This
paper seeks to fill this gap in the literature.
This study uses the same 51 sample countries used by
Brown et al. (2014). Although the enforcement indices were
measured in three separate years (2002, 2005 and 2008) in
their study, they are highly correlated (with the correlations
exceeding .8). This paper focuses on the enforcement data
for 2008, which captures the most up-to-date information
and immediately precedes the financial crisis. Given that
national characteristics such as culture and religion are
unlikely to change, the model presented in this study may
have broad applicability to understanding the prospects of
other globalization efforts.
Brown et al. (2014) collected the data from national
security regulators’ data sets about accounting enforcement
efforts. Countries scored between a 0 and 2 with respect to 6
dimensions of enforcement. The dimensions of enforcement
include whether (a) there are regulators or monitors over
financial reporting and financial markets, (b) said monitor
has the power to set accounting and auditing standards, (c)
the monitor reviews financial statements, (d) the monitor
provides a report about such a review, (e) the monitor has
taken enforcement action for any financial statements, and
(f) the level of resourcing of the enforcement effort (based on
the number of staff employed by the monitor or regulator).
Our sample was reduced to 42 countries due to the data
availability with respect to our main explanatory variables,
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Table 1  Nations used in Brown et al. (2014)
Argentina*
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
Chile
China
Croatia
Czech Republic*
Denmark
Egypt
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hong Kong*
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Ireland
Israel*
Italy
Japan
Jordan

Korea (South)*
Malaysia
Mexico
Morocco
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines*
Poland
Portugal
Romania*
Russia
Singapore
Slovenia
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan*
Thailand
Turkey
Ukraine*
United Kingdom
United States

*Data availability problems led to the exclusion of asterisked (*)
nations from the sample

discussed in the next section. Table 1 identifies the countries used.

Research model
The model tested is:
ENFORCE2008 =b1(Individualism) + b2(Power Distance)
+ b3(Uncertainty Avoidance)
+ b4(Factionalized Elites) + b5(Prot_Pct)
+ b6(Buddh_Pct) + b7(Islam_Pct) + b8(Hindu_Pct)
+ b9(Relg_Oth) + b10(Religion Important)
+ b11(Legal) + b12(Market_Liquidity) + e

The dependent variable, ENFORCE2008, is the 2008
accounting enforcement index developed in Brown et al.
(2014). Main variables of interest include culture, religious affiliations, religiosity and factionalized elites. Following previous studies (e.g., Duong et al. 2016; Han
et al. 2010), Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are used to
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measure each country’s cultural values. Hofstede’s cultural
values are the most widely used measures of national culture.9 Following the same literature, Individualism (IND),
Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) and Power Distance (PD) are
used as the main cultural variables relating to regulations
and enforcement. Hofstede culture data was drawn from
http://geert-hofstede.com/dimensions.html.
To measure the political environment and frangibility of
the states, Factionalized elites scores published by The Fund
for Peace are used (http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/indicators/
c2/).10 Religious affiliation data, by nation, were taken from
Mensah’s (2014), Table 10, p. 281. It measures the percentage of the population professing the following religions: Protestant Christian (coded as PROT_PCT), Roman Catholic/
Orthodox (all varieties) and Coptic (coded as CHRST_OTH),
Buddhist (coded as BUDDH_PCT), Islamic (all branches—
coded as ISLAM_PCT), and Hindu (coded as HINDU_PCT).
All other religions, atheist beliefs, and no religions were classified (coded) in RELG_OTH (the residual percentage). Mensah (2014) obtained the data on the “distribution of religious
faith” from sources such as the Pew Foundation, Wikipedia.
com, CIA Factbook, specific country Internet websites and
general web searches. The importance of religion (religiosity)
data were obtained from global Gallup Poll research, found at
http://www.gallup.com/poll/142727/religiosity-highes t-world
-poorest-nations.aspx (Gallup.com, 8/31/2010).
Market liquidity was used as a control variable because a
desired feature of a well-functioning capital market is market liquidity. Previous studies have shown the strong link
between market liquidity and quality financial reporting
(e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia 1991). Greater regulatory

9

Aside then from the widespread use of Hofstede’s measures, even
the oft-posited alternative, House et al.’s (2004) measure is in itself
‘broadly consistent’ with Hofstede’s own findings (for similar concordance of Hofstede measure-based results with House et al.’s
(2004) measure-based results, see Ashraf et al. 2016). Further, as
Hooghiemstra et al. (2015, p. 365) state, Hofstede’s measures “are the
most widely used measures of national culture and have produced a
widely accepted, well defined, empirically based terminology to characterize culture”. Even if House et al.’s (2004) GLOBE measure were
equal in quality to that of Hofstede (e.g., an assertion which Voss
2012, finds incorrect) the very widespread use of Hofstede’s measure
provides researchers the ability to better understand how the current
research fits in with the vast array of other research out there.
10
Of the alternative indicators of national dysfunction developed
by the Fund for Peace, e.g., security apparatus, group grievances,
state legitimacy, the factionalization of the elite variable seems best
to reflect the authors’ concerns that the regulatory apparatus over
accounting might be a so-called political football, in that its functioning or lack of same may give an advantage to one elite faction as
opposed to another. The variable is a measure of the brinksmanship
and gridlock between ruling elites. It is also true that the factionalized
elites variable was extremely highly correlated with the other Fund
for Peace variables, with the correlations ranging from a low of .754
to a high of .910.
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enforcement should provide the reassurance to investors
(domestic and foreign) that their investments will be safe
and that the information disclosed to them about their investments is more likely to be accurate. Christensen et al. (2013)
show that the increased market liquidity was attributed to
the concurrent enforcement changes of financial reporting
in those countries, such as the creation of enforcement bodies supervising compliance with IFRS, instead of existing
strong legal system or financial market regulations. Market
liquidity is controlled too, therefore, since previous studies
have found that nations whose markets are more developed
and better functioning have a better regulatory apparatus and
enforcement mechanism (e.g., La Porta et al. 2006). Hence,
it is important to control for market liquidity in assessing the
impact of our test variables on accounting enforcement. We
also used Legal system (common law versus code law country origins) because literature (e.g., La Porta et al. 1998)
focuses on whether a country is setup with a common law
or code law legal system. Studies have repeatedly found that
common law systems are better for investor protections. This
could mean that countries with common law legal systems
will have stronger accounting regulatory enforcement efforts
because of these protections. However, it could also lead to
weaker enforcement efforts of accounting regulation because
the legal system itself is setup to help provide an atmosphere
of compliance. It seemed, therefore, important to control
for legal system too. Further, Brown et al. (2014) found that
Enforcement scores are significantly higher in common law
countries. Here, LEGAL is set as 1 denoting a common
law country and 0 denoting a code law country. The variables used, their definitions and the sources are presented
in Table 2. The descriptive statistics for these variables are
presented in Table 3, Panel A.
Table 3, Panel B, shows the comparison of the mean
ENFORCE2008 variable values for countries by various
criterion variables. The medians of the data are used as the
criterion for cultural dimensions, religiosity, factionalized
elites and market liquidity variables to calculate the average
accounting enforcement scores above and below the median.
For religion variables, this study compares the means of the
accounting enforcement scores among countries with greater
than 50% of the population said to be of a particular faith.
For the control variable legal systems, this study calculates
and compares the means of accounting enforcement scores
for countries with common law systems versus those with
code law systems.
The result shows that the mean Enforcement score is
17.14 for countries whose IND scores are above the median
(i.e., individualistic countries) versus 8.62 for those whose
IND scores are below the median (i.e., collectivistic countries). Using the median Power Distance score as the criterion, the mean enforcement score is 16.1 for low Power
Distance (Lo-PD) countries, versus 9.67 for high Power
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Table 2  Definitions of variables
Name and symbol

Measure

ACCOUNTING ENFORCEMENT
(ENFORCE2008)
INDIVIDUAL (IND)

The sum of accounting-related enforcement measures, as calculated and reported on in Brown et al.
(2014). The constituent elements are defined in the text itself
Measure of Individualism/Collectivism. The higher the score on this measure, the greater the societal
preference for individual self care-taking and responsibilities. Hofstede culture data (IND, PD and
UA) were drawn from http://geert-hofstede.com/dimensions.html
POWER DISTANCE (PD)
Measure of Power Distance. The higher the PD score, the more the less powerful members of a society
accept and expect that power is distributed unequally
UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE (UA) Measure of Uncertainty Avoidance. Greater scores indicate a higher desire to avoid uncertainty and
ambiguity
FACTIONALIZEDELITES
This measure of the fragility of states was obtained from http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2008-sorta
ble
LEGAL
Measure of legal origin. It is set to 1 if nation is common law and 0 if a civil code nation, following
Kanagaretnam et al. (2014)
PROT_PCT
Measures the percentage of the population of the Protestant faith. Mensah’s data covers the years 2000–
2012. He makes the assumption that the population percentages of a given faith are stable over time
CHRISTIAN_OTH (CHRST_OTH)
Measures the percentage of the population that are of Christian faith but not Protestant. Based on Mensah (2014)
HINDU_PCT
Measures the percentage of the population reportedly of the Hindu faith. Based on Mensah (2014)
BUDDH_PCT
Measures the percentage of the population reportedly of the Buddhist faith. Based on Mensah (2014)
ISLAM_PCT
Measures the percentage of the population reportedly of the Islamic faith. Based on Mensah (2014)
RELG_OTH
Measures the percentage of the population said to profess a religion other than described above, or not
professing a religion. Based on Mensah (2014)
RELIGIONIMPORTANT
The importance of religion data was taken from http://www.gallup.com/poll/142727/religiosity-highe
st-world-poorest-nations.aspx
MARKETLIQUIDITY
Market liquidity is the average total value of stocks traded as a percentage of GDP for the period
2005–2008 (e.g., La Porta et al. 2006). Source: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableSe
lection/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-indicators

Distance (Hi-PD) countries. In the same vein, the mean
enforcement score for low Uncertainty Avoidance (UA)
countries is higher than the one for high UA countries, 15.9
versus 9.85. Taken together, the result shows that countries
that are more individualistic, having lower power distance
and lower uncertainty avoidance have stronger accounting
enforcement on average.
For religion variables, this paper finds that countries
with the majority Protestant Christian populations and those
whose population does not have a majority religion, or with
religion other than the five major religions, or being primarily atheists have the highest mean accounting enforcement
scores, 17.29 and 20.14, respectively. The number in the
parentheses indicates the number of countries in that group.
The result also reveals that accounting enforcement scores
are lower on average for countries with a high degree of
religiosity, that is where religion is considered more important, with an enforcement score of 9.76, compared to the
mean enforcement score of 16 for countries where religion
is considered less important.
As for countries with factionalized elites, the mean
enforcement score is 10.48, versus an enforcement score
of 15.29 for countries that are more politically coherent,

i.e., less factionalized. In addition, for control variables, it
is found that the accounting enforcement score is higher for
countries with common law system and well-functioning
capital markets (measured as market liquidity), as expected
The multivariate analysis is described next.

Research method and statistical analysis
Before running the model, following Mensah (2014), the
CHRST_OTH variable is excluded to avoid the multicollinearity problem that would arise using it since the sum of the
religious adherence variables in the model would otherwise
sum to 100. The initial results indicated that although the
model had a significant adjusted r2 of .40, the only term in
the model showing significance was the constant. In addition, an inspection of the correlation matrix (see Table 4)
reveals a pattern of high correlations among the study variables. While a formal multicollinearity statistic might not
demonstrate a problem, such high correlations are a concern
since some regression coefficients might have their significance levels altered due to the high correlations. Given that
there are only 42 cases with 12 independent variables, the
output statistics might be suspect since there are only 3.5
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Table 3  Descriptive information

Panel A: Descriptive statistics (N = 42)
ENFORCE2008
IND
PD
FACTIONALIZEDELITES
UA
LEGAL
PROT_PCT
BUDDH_PCT
ISLAM_PCT
HINDU_PCT
RELG_OTH
RELIGIONIMPORTANT
MARKETLIQUIDITY
Criterion

Mean

SD

25%

Median

75%

12.88
50.90
55.45
4.295
64.64
.31
20.57
6.50
17.77
2.42
16.40
57.71
74.97

6.425
24.286
20.800
2.588
23.465
.468
29.006
18.644
32.712
12.397
15.884
27.989
66.429

8.000
27.000
35.750
1.800
48.000
.000
.775
.100
.875
.000
1.208
32.750
22.394

12.000
49.500
61.500
3.950
66.500
.000
4.875
.290
3.550
.075
12.555
60.000
54.844

19.000
71.750
70.000
6.725
86.000
1.000
35.858
1.025
8.550
.520
24.435
83.750
115.500

Cultural dimensions

Panel B: Comparison of mean accounting enforcement scores for 2008 by various criterion variables
Median
Hi-IND
Lo-IND
Lo-PD
Hi-PD
ENFORCE2008
17.14
8.62
16.1
9.67
Religions
> 50% PopulaPROT_PCT (7)
CHRST_OTH (17) HINDU_PCT (1)
BUDH_PCT (3)
tions except*
ENFORCE2008
17.29
11.06
6
10.67
RELIGIONIMPORTANT
Median
High
Low
ENFORCE2008
9.76
16
Factionalized elites
Median
Politically coherent Politically divided
ENFORCE2008
15.29
10.48
Controls
Common law (13)
Code law (29)
High market liquid- Low market liquidity
ity
ENFORCE2008
15.08
11.9
15.86
9.9

Lo-UA
15.9

Hi-UA
9.85

ISLAM_PCT (7) RELG_OTH (7)*
7.57

20.14

*Note that the following nations did not have a majority of population professing the five major religions and are included Relg_OTH: China,
Netherland, Belgium, New Zealand, Germany, Austria and Canada

cases per independent variable (Draper and Smith 1998;
Babyak 2004). Accordingly, principal component analysis, a data reduction technique, was employed to explore
whether the variables reflected underlying latent variables
that in themselves are meaningful in achieving the research
objectives. This use of data reduction techniques is consistent with Ali and Hwang (2000) who noted that variables
within a country tend to be very highly correlated, rendering
the use of individual variables in a regression problematic.
The principal components factor analysis resulted in
the generation of three factors. The resulting three components or factors were then rotated using the Varimax rotation scheme. An orthogonal rotation scheme was used in
order to generate factors that themselves were uncorrelated
with the other factors. Using uncorrelated factors eases the

interpretation of the factors uncovered. In order to ascertain, though, whether the forced orthogonality affected the
results, Direct Oblimin rotation was also performed. It does
not force the results to be orthogonal. The results are qualitatively similar.
Factor scores were generated by the SPSS factor analysis
routine, using the regression method, and saved to the database.11 Rummel (1970) notes that factor scores should be
11

SPSS v. 21 provides three alternative means to generate factor
scores: regression, Bartlett, and Anderson–Rubin. Each has advantages and disadvantages, as summarized in DiStefano et al. (2009).
The regressions were run using factor scores generated by all three
methods. There were no meaningful quantitative or qualitative differences unearthed. Therefor the results are presented using the SPSS
default regression method of generating factor scores.

**Two-sided significance below 1% level, *Two-sided significance below 5% level

.305*
.127
− .120
.064
− .671** − .517**
.219
.270
.354*
.606**
.189
.167
− .228
− .401**
.501**
.636**
− .357* − .219
− .242
.164
.587**
− .334*
− .428**
− .036
.379*
− .592**
.455**
− .371*
.232
.477**
− .021
− .412**
− .152
.397**
− .554**
.505**

.638**
− .702**
− .585**
.679**
− .463**
− .456**

IND
PD
FACTIONALIZEDELITES
UA
LEGAL
PROT_PCT
BUDDH_PCT
ISLAM_PCT
HINDU_PCT
RELG_OTH
RELIGIONIMPORTANT
MARKETLIQUIDITY

Table 4  Correlations

ENFORCE2008 IND

PD

Factionalized UA
elites

− .483**
− .510**
.091
− .194
.401**
.004
− .039
− .212
.277
− .002
.007
.208
.083
− .420**
.280

− .209
− .309*
− .110
.077
− .500**
.489**

− .078
− .016
.079
.043
.062

.009
− .444**
.608**
− .142

LEGAL PROT_PCT BUDDH_PCT ISLAM_PCT

− .171
.143
− .005

− .721**
.224

HINDU_PCT RELG_OTH

− .350*

Religion
important
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interpreted just as any data for any variable is interpreted.
He notes, for example, that population is a “composite of
population subgroups.” Rummel goes on to note that the
resulting composite variables are useful in other analyses, including regression analyses. Unlike other variables,
Rummel notes, the phenomena are highly interrelated. This
notion, of course, is consistent with Ali and Hwang’s (2000)
justification for the use of principal factor analysis in their
study. Appendix A provides a more detailed explanation of
our use of principal components analysis and factor score
regression.
It is customary to choose a loading level for “admitting”
variables into interpretation. In this exploratory study, the
authors interpret each of the three components and the relationship of the variables with the component based on the
factor that the variable loaded most highly on, with .3 being
the minimally acceptable loading.
The rotated factor loadings are presented in Table 5. Panel
A presents the eigenvalues of each factor and the variance
in all the variables which is accounted for by that factor.
The rotated factor loadings, which measure the correlation
between the original variables and the factors, are presented
in Panel B. Rotated Factor 1 is most highly loaded upon
by variables including Prot_PCT, PD, IND and FactionalizedElites. It captures the difference between nations that
are highly unequal, with combative—fractious or factionalized—elites that are less likely to have high percentages of
Protestant confessants, are less individualistic, and have less
liquid markets. Therefore, it is labeled FractiousPD. Rotated
Factor 2, denoted as Religiosity, is most highly loaded upon
by ReligionImportant, ISLAM_PCT and OTHER_RELG.
It captures the difference between nations that differ in
perceived religion’s importance and in adherence to the
Islamic faith. Rotated Factor 3, loaded upon most highly by
LEGAL and UA, is labeled as LawandUA. It reflects divisions between countries that follow the common law versus
civic code and are less likely to be Uncertainty Avoidant.
The Hindu_Pct variable loaded most highly on this third
rotated factor, but only marginally so.12
With these interpretations in hand, the factor scores
were entered into a multiple regression routine, allowing
generation of the association between the factor scores and
accounting enforcement (ENFORCE2008). The regression
results are discussed in the next section.

12

These are the interpretations of the factors based on the variables
included.
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Table 5  Principal component analysis
Panel A: KMO and Bartlett’s test
Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure of sampling adequacy
Bartlett’s test of sphericity
Approx. χ2
df
Sig.
Component

.711
239.820
66
.000

Initial eigenvalues
Total

Panel B: Total variance explained
1
4.449
2
2.047
3
1.480
4
1.021
5
.753
Component

Panel B: Total variance explained
1
2
3

Extraction sum of squared loadings

% of variance

Cumulative %

Total

% of variance

Cumulative %

37.076
17.057
12.33
8.507
6.276

37.076
54.133
66.463
74.970
81.246

4.449
2.047
1.480

37.076
17.057
12.33

37.076
54.133
66.463

Rotated sum of squared loadings
Total

% of variance

Cumulative %

3.365
2.578
2.033

28.038
21.485
16.940

28.038
49.523
66.463

Component
Panel C: Rotated component matrixa
PROT_PCT
PD
IND
FACTIONALIZEDELITES
MARKETLIQUIDITY
RELG_OTH
RELIGIONIMPORTANT
ISLAM_PCT
LEGAL
UA
BUDDH_PCT
HINDU_PCT

1

2

3

− .852
.809
− .777
.628
− .500
− .050
.453
.234
− .041
.438
.528
.050

− .107
.258
− .351
.534
− .174
− .855
.786
.748
− .009
− .064
− .298
.247

.165
− .027
.041
.188
.460
− .012
.018
.005
.834
− .722
.620
.395

Extraction method: principal component analysis
Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser normalization
a

Rotation converged in 6 iterations

Discussion of results
The results of regressing ENFORCE2008 on the factors or
component scores are presented in Table 6. Given that there
were only three component variables in the regression and
a sample size of 42, there were 14 observations for each
variable in the regression, above the often cited need for
at least 10 observations per variable in a regression (e.g.,
Draper and Smith 1998; Babyak 2004). This supports the

validity of the findings reported. Further, the model r2 was
.503, with the adjusted r2 value being .463. The model itself
was significant at the p < .01 level, with the F value being
12.802. There were no multicollinearity issues, an expected
result given that the factor scores extracted were orthogonal.
Although the variables of interest were presented singly in
the hypotheses, the model to test the hypotheses singly could
not be interpreted due to multicollinearity concerns and the
overfitting of the model. Therefore, the component scores
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Table 6  Regression results
ENFORCE2008 = b1(FractiousPD) + b2(ReligImport) + b3(Lawand
UA) + e
ENFORCE2008

(Constant)
FractiousPD
Religiosity
LawandUA
F
Adjusted R2
R2

Coefficient

t Value

12.881
− .517
− .428
.229
12.802***
.463
.503

17.737***
− 4.520***
− 3.738***
2.001*

***p < .01 **p < .05 *p < .10

and the items that loaded most strongly on these components
are interpreted to ascertain support for the hypotheses.
The hypotheses represent broad categories of national
culture, political environment, religion and religious importance. At least one variable belonging to each of these broad
categories loaded highly on at least one component and the
factor scores generated were used as variables in the regression equation. All three of the resultant independent component variables proved significant predictors of accounting
enforcement efforts. Therefore, all hypotheses were accepted
at least at the level of .10. The following discussion of the
results references the independent variables created through
the factor analysis.
The regression results show that the coefficient on FractiousPD variable was negative (− .517) and significant at the
p < .01 level. The Religiosity variable was negative (− .428)
and significant at the p < .01 level as well. The LawandUA
variable was positive (.229) and marginally significant at
the p = .053 level. In order to determine the incremental
contribution of each factor score variable to the variance of
the dependent variable, ENFORCE2008, each variable was
entered one at a time into the regression equation in descending order of eigenvalues, an index of the strength of the component (Table 5 Panel A). FractiousPD accounted for 26.7%
of variance in ENFORCE2008. Religiosity accounted for an
additional 18.3% of variance in ENFORCE2008. Finally,
LawandUA accounted for a further 5.2% of variance in
ENFORCE2008 (not tabulated).13
The results show that the most important set of variables
in accounting for national accounting regulatory choices
was the cultural and political setting in which the standard

13
Please note that the proportion of variance accounted for numbers
were rounded, accounting for the difference between the total variance accounted for of the model of 50.3% and the summed variance
accounted for of the three individual components of 50.2%.
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setting occurred. Religion plays an important role as well.
The FractiousPD component was significantly and negatively associated with accounting enforcement at the p < .01
level. It is most highly loaded upon by variables including
Prot_PCT (− .852), PD (.809), IND (− .777) and FactionalizedElites (.628). The numbers in the parentheses shows the
correlation between the variables and the factor. Combined
with the sign on the FractiousPD factor, the result indicates
that countries ranked high in Individualism and low in Power
Distance have stronger accounting enforcement activities.
This is consistent with the finding of Hofstede et al. (2010)
that countries with high Individualism scores prefer more
rules. These settings also happened to be more likely to be
Protestant, as evidenced by the negative loading of the variable on the FractiousPD component.
Further, we can also state that the result shows that in
national settings characterized by fractious elites—essentially (peacefully) warring political/economic classes, strong
accounting regulatory efforts were less likely. With respect
to the hypotheses, therefore, control variable market liquidity is loaded most highly on the FractiousPD component,
but with a negative loading, market liquidity was therefore
positively related to accounting enforcement, consistent with
previous studies. Therefore, the hypotheses on cultural variables IND (Hypothesis 1) and Power Distance (Hypothesis
2), on political variable FactionalizedElites (Hypothesis 4),
and on religious affiliation (Hypothesis 5), were accepted.
These results, even by themselves, bear out the suspicion
that nations are more like syndromes than symptoms, that
the confluence of different elements collectively determines
the level of accounting enforcement efforts. The underlying
relation here may be that more “Westernized” nations with
greater commitment to interpersonal equality living in less
contentious political and economic environments (at least
insofar as national elites are concerned) are more likely to
have stronger accounting regulation and better functioning
markets as measured here by market liquidity.
The results with respect to the second factor score-derived
variable, Religiosity, show it was significantly and negatively
related to the dependent variable accounting enforcement at
the p < .01 level. With respect to the Religiosity component,
the highest loading variable was RELG_OTH, which loaded
negatively on the component. This shows that RELG_OTH
is positively associated with accounting enforcement.
ISLAM_PCT on the other hand loaded positively on the
second component, indicating that it is negatively associated with accounting enforcement. The conjunction of these
two religious variables, loading in opposite directions on the
Religiosity Component, suggests that religious identification
is highly associated with accounting enforcement efforts.
Having a religious identification therefore is not enough to
support a statement that religious identification is associated
with greater accounting enforcement. Instead, the identity
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of the particular religion or religious identification needs
to be taken into account. Therefore, the finding on religion
with the second component supports the acceptance of
Hypothesis 5. The positive loading of the ReligionImportant variable on the Religiosity Component and the latter’s
negative relationship to the dependent variable suggests that
religious importance reduces the presence of strong accounting enforcement, accepting Hypothesis 6.
Given that Mensah’s (2014) RELG_OTH variable consisted of a hodgepodge of smaller religions and those who
did not belong to any religion or were atheists, the Religiosity
factor score-generated variable seems to capture the importance of religious adherence. Religion serves an important
role in providing guidance to correct behavior, to setting a
sense of community solidarity, and orienting one’s thoughts
about one’s place in the universe, and how one might behave
to be “right” with it. The Religiosity component’s negative
relationship to ENFORCE2008 seems to indicate that as
religious importance grows in the constituent nations of
the sample, there is a negative association with accounting
enforcement regulation. It may be, therefore, that a strongly
felt religious devotion itself may be considered sufficient to
guide behavior. This is an important finding because it suggests that the long-term growth in secular (non-religious)
proportions of the population around the globe will weaken
the expected influence of religion on behavior. Thus, as the
binding power of religion on behavior, to the extent that it
exists, weakens, there will be pressures for greater growth
of the regulatory state.14
The third and final factor score-derived variable, LawandUA, was positively associated with ENFORCE2008 at less
than the p < .1 significance level. The LawandUA composite
variable was created from a component which is most highly
loaded with variables LEGAL code (.834), UA (− .722) and
BUDDH_PCT (.620).15 That the resulting factor score variable was positively associated with ENFORCE2008 indicates that nations with common law codes were associated
with having stronger accounting regulation. This result is
consistent with La Porta et al. (1998) who found that common law countries had better investor protections than did
civil code countries.

14
For evidence on trends in religious observance around the world,
see http://www.pewforum.org/2018/06/13/why-do-levels-of-religiousobservance-vary-by-age-and-country/.
15
The difference in factor loadings of BUDDH_PCT on the third
factor, upon which it has a .62 loading, and BUDDH_PCT’s loading
on the first factor, upon which it had a .52 loading, led us to drop it
from consideration in naming the factor since the difference in the
loadings between the two factors was just .092. Thus, there was but
a piddling difference in loadings between the two factors, rendering
interpretation of the variable difficult, given the opposite effect of the
first and the third component on ENFORCE2008.
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This finding suggests that common law country status is
associated with stronger accounting regulation, a result consistent with Brown et al. (2014). These results also show that
Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) was negatively loaded on the
third component, a component whose factor score was positively related to accounting regulation, accepting Hypothesis
3. This suggests that higher UA countries had less tough
accounting regulation. In the instance, this seems strange.
Would greater regulation not protect the investor better, and
therefore diminish some of the uncertainty that investors
would face in the markets? Perhaps, but stronger regulation
betokens as well stronger governments and the actions of
governments themselves may be considered threats. As previously noted, original source unknown, the government that
can give you anything you want has the power to take away
anything you have, and since personal control of others is
unlikely, such a situation may be more threatening than lack
of control. Therefore, people in low UA countries are more
tolerant of the change brought forth by regulatory changes
if they believe such change is necessary.

Conclusions
This research was undertaken to explore the association
between national cultural elements, religious adherence
choices and importance and political coherence (as marked
by the factionalized elites variable) on national choices of
accounting enforcement. In effect, this study tests a model of
whether national characteristics are associated with accounting-related enforcement efforts. These results demonstrate
the fruitfulness of investigating nation-level constructs in
cross-national accounting research.
This study has demonstrated the importance of cultural, religious, political, legal and finance-related (market
liquidity) factors in affecting national accounting regulatory
efforts. In doing so, it adds a necessary corrective to discussions that focus on the words that set out the structure of a
regulatory enforcement regime while ignoring the context
within which such enforcement regimes take place. The
importance of understanding such context is highlighted
by recent anti-globalization trends (e.g., Summers 2016). It
is important to note that the effects reported here occurred
despite the existence of difference-flattening organizations
such as the European Union. Of the 42 nations in the active
sample (nations without an asterisk next to their names in
Table 1), 20 are members of the European Union. The fact
that religion and national culture still played an important
part in predicting levels of regulation argues for the continuing relevance of national characteristics in determining
national behavior, even when nations are part of a supranational economic and political entity that has its own regulatory, judicial and political institutions that can make binding
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decisions for the membership. Such a finding is of particular
importance when international news gathering organizations
frequently report on the truculence of nations (e.g., Poland
in the Summer of 2018) with respect to the (in Poland’s case
judiciary-related) rules of the larger entity (European Union)
of which they are apart. These findings suggest the need
for further research into the effectiveness of international
agencies and institutions in binding the constituent nations’
behaviors. This finer analysis was not a goal in this study, but
should be pursued in a variety of areas, within accounting
and outside it. Given the importance of transnational capital
flows, studies of national characteristics and the effectiveness of cross-national regulation of financial investments and
behavior seem appropriate.
This study has limitations. The examination of the determinants of accounting regulation enforcement is incomplete
because it focuses on the state of the sample nations at a
particular point in time. Nations, though, have long, often
traumatic and dynamic histories. Their pasts may contain
significant events that continue to shape the way regulation
is seen in the present, especially—perhaps—when such
regulation is tied into the operation of international markets
whose imposition on the home nation’s prerogatives may be
a source of conflict and controversy. The 2016–2019 Brexit
struggles and debates in the United Kingdom are an example. Further, as Baggini (2018) describes, national religions
and national cultures differ greatly, nation to nation, continent to continent, based on the unique histories that shaped
these religions and cultures. Ways of perceiving the world
and placing a value on what is seen, on what is important;
ways of understanding reality itself differ markedly. Also
markedly different between nations is the level of felt community and the importance of such to denizens of different
nations. These factors are not explored in this study but are
very worthy of follow-on work. Also important is developing an understanding of how regulation is affected by strings
of seemingly ineluctable events that follow from much earlier events in a nation’s history. Such a path-dependent type
analysis would help provide the researchers in regulation
with a much richer understanding of the rich contexts that
give rise to regulation structure adoption and employment.
Consistent with this, of course, is the need to more explicitly
develop an understanding of how pressures to regulatory isomorphism arise due to globalization, and how such pressures
interact with national characteristics—both current (e.g., the
ones measured in this study) and historical. Nations are not
static entities. They change and develop overtime, developing unique dynamics based on their histories.
In addition, the postulated path dependency may also
reflect the existence, or lack of same, of key institutional
elements that may promote greater or lesser adherence to
accounting regulation normative drives. Such institutional
elements may include rule of law, existence of written and
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unwritten constitutions, economic powers that exist within
nation states that may have interests that lead them to abet
the promotion of accounting enforcement, or lead them to
deter it. In addition, histories of corruption, and popular
reactions and ability (or lack) to deter its occurrence, are
also factors that should be explored further. None of these
suggestions takes away from the need to deepen the analysis of how religion and culture affect accounting enforcement that we provide in this study.
This study, for example, provides only an aggregate
analysis of the impact of religious identification on
accounting enforcement. Further, the results may be tied to
the sample nations’ level of development. In addition, this
study does not address whether the existence of several
religions with large followings within a nation state has
an impact on the results reported. To the extent that one
religious identification (e.g., Protestant) is more closely
associated with greater enforcement than another, how
does that interact with the presence of many adherents
of another religious (e.g., Catholicism or Other) within a
nation when adherence to the latter may have less of an
association with greater enforcement? Similarly, different regions (or religions) of a country may, for historical
or other reasons, have different levels of power within a
national establishment and therefore different levels of
power, perhaps, with respect to instituting and maintaining accounting enforcement efforts. This study does not
address the impact on accounting enforcement. Further,
there may be an association between regional identity
and religious affiliation. Does this add to the impact on
accounting enforcement? Pew Research (http://www.
pewfor um.org/2018/06/13/why-do-levels -of-religi ousobservance-vary-by-age-and-countr y/) reports that there
is a drop off in religious adherence among younger generations, as opposed to older generations. It is also true that
different nations are, on average, aging at different speeds.
This study does not address whether age distributions in
national populations have an impact on accounting regulation. Nor does it examine whether, or how, different age
distributions in a population affect such decision making,
taking into account the characteristics of governing elites
within a nation. These, too, are considerations that deserve
to be addressed in future work.
Finally, many of the sample nations had been colonies
or protectorates of Western colonial powers (e.g., Great
Britain and France). Further research should consider
breaking out the impact, if any, of such historic associations on national accounting (and other) enforcement
choices. Do former colonies tend to share the preferences
of their former colonial dominant? Or reject them? How
do the results change if such religiously idiosyncratic
nations as the United States (more religious than most
Western nations) are removed from the sample? Or if
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other Western nations (e.g., Europe and Australia) were
eliminated as well?16 These Western nations are among
the very wealthiest in the sample. Does their presence alter
the results? Further research should control for GDP per
capita and investor characteristics, including levels of public company ownership and perhaps indices of felt financial security among the investing populace, and among
those who might choose to invest if they felt comfortable
with the markets and the truthfulness of financial reporting. Understanding these dynamics is important to achieving a richer understanding of regulation’s adoption and
implementation.
This study also has the limitation of a small sample size,
but much international accounting literature bears the burden of small sample sizes (e.g., Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai
2007; Richardson 2007; Kleinman and Lin 2017). That said,
the nations in this study do include major and medium economic powers, therefore the variables developed in their
research are important ones to study. Future research should
investigate the dynamic changes of accounting enforcement
across time and regions of the world.

Appendix A
This appendix describes how we addressed the methodological issues presented by having a limited data set—although a
respectably sized one for international research using nation
states as the observation units, and highly correlated variables (see Ali and Hwang 2000). The number of variables
in our data set, even in the absence of multicollinearity, may
result in overfitting of the model. Babyak (2004, p. 411)
defines overfitting as “asking too much from the data.” He
goes on to say that, “Given a certain number of observations
in a data set, there is an upper limit to the complexity of the
model that can be derived with any acceptable degree of
uncertainty. Complexity arises as a function of the number
of degrees of freedom expended (the number of predictors
including complex terms such as interactions and nonlinear
terms) against the same data set during any stage of the data
analysis.” The problem with this, he notes, is that “findings”
that appear in an overfitted model don’t really exist in the
population and hence will not replicate.” Given, as Babyak
(2004) notes, that if “you put enough predictors in a model
you will get a result that is impressive, but lacks substance,”
we chose to use a data reduction routine. Absent that routine,
our initial results showed an adjusted r2 of .40, with only the
constant term in the model showing significance. Given that
we only have 42 cases with 12 independent variables, our
output statistics might be suspect.

Draper and Smith (1998; see also Babyak 2004) state that
there should be 10 observations for each independent variable, something that may also be true in principal components analysis.17 In this regression, that is not possible since
we only have a complete set of data on 42 nations, thus we
only have 3.5 observations per independent variable. In addition, an inspection of the correlation matrix (see Table 4)
reveals a pattern of high correlations among study variables.
While a formal multicollinearity statistic might not demonstrate a problem, such high correlations are a concern since
some regression coefficients might have their significance
levels altered due to the high correlations. Accordingly, we
employed data reduction techniques to explore whether the
variables reflected underlying latent variables that in themselves are meaningful in terms of our research objectives.
Our use of data reduction techniques is consistent with Ali
and Hwang (2000) who also employed it in their study of
government versus private standard setting in 16 countries.
Ali and Hwang (2000) noted that variables within a country
tend to be very highly correlated, rendering the use of individual variables in a regression problematic. Preliminary
analyses of our data indicate that Ali and Hwang’s (2000)
concerns hold true here as well.
Di Stefano et al. (2009, p. 1) note that exploratory factor analysis may be used “for a variety of purposes such as
reducing a large number of items to a smaller number of
components, uncovering latent dimensions underlying a data
set, or examining which items have the strongest association with a given factor.” Rummel (1970) sees several uses
for factor analysis. These include (a) interdependency and
pattern identification; (b) parsimony or data reduction; (c)
uncovering the basic structure of a domain; (d) scaling; (d)
data transformation; (e) mapping and (f) hypothesis testing.
We clearly are interested in data reduction, as noted above.
Given the high intercorrelation of many of our variables, it
is also important to use factor analysis to uncover the underlying structure of the domain we explore. Uncovering the
basic structure of the domain(s) involved is also important
to provide greater insight into the environments that give rise
to greater or lesser regulation. Thus, the use of factor analysis helps generate rich insight into, and resources to derive
from, the varied environments within which regulation may
occur. Further, given that the process of generating the factor structure also gives rise to the ability to generate factor
loadings, the output of the factor analysis enables us to see
how different countries load on the different factors found
if we wish. We also can, and will, use the resultant factor
scores to test the hypotheses developed earlier in the paper.
While the variables do not exist in isolation, as presented in

17
16

We are very grateful to the reviewer for these suggestions.

For example, please see http://statistics.ats.ucla.edu/stat/spss/outpu
t/principal_components.htm.
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the hypotheses, the loadings of each variable on the factors
enable us to see which factor the variables are most highly
correlated with. The different facets that describe a nation
are more like syndromes than individual symptoms and the
value of exploratory factor analysis to the researcher is that
he/she can explore how collections of symptoms (a.k.a., syndromes) affect the research questions of interest. In a way,
then, the use of factor scores provides a more realistic look
at the forces that affect regulatory effort than does the use of
variables in a regression alone.
The data reduction technique that we used was Factor
Analysis with a principal components extraction. The scree
plot indicated that we had three factors or components.
Using all the variables listed, we found that we had a Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling Adequacy
of .49. We dropped the CHRST_OTH variable from the factor analysis and found that the KMO measure increased to
.78. This measure varies between 0 and 1, and values closer
to 1 are better. We chose CHRST_OTH to drop first because
our earlier attempts to conduct a regression analysis of the
data showed that, of the religion variables, its presence in
the regression equation alone triggered a VIF score much
greater than 10, a typically cited threshold for multicollinearity (Kennedy 2000). A KMO measure of .6 is considered the minimal threshold (see http://statistics.ats.ucla.edu/
stat/spss/output/principal_components.htm); therefore, the
results of the factor analysis that included the other variables
but not CHRST_OTH were deemed acceptable. The three
extracted components accounted for 66.5% of total variance.
The first component accounted for 37.1% of total variance,
the second component accounted for an additional 17.1%
of total variance, and the third component accounted for
12.3% of total variance. In addition, Bartlett’s test of sphericity rejects the null hypothesis that the correlation matrix
is an identity matrix (p < .01). Rejection of Bartlett’s test of
sphericity is important in accepting the results of the factor
analysis threshold (see http://statis tics. ats.ucla.edu/stat/spss/
output/principal_components.htm). These results indicate
the validity of the three factors, and related factor scores,
generated.
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